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Abstract 
Dempster/Shafer (D/S) theory has been advocated as a way of representing 
incompleteness of evidence in a system' s knowledge base. Methods now exist 
for propagating beliefs through chains of inference. This paper discusses how 
rules with attached beliefs, a common representation for knowledge in 
automated reasoning systems, can be transformed into the joint belief 
functions required by propagation algorithms. A rule is taken as defining a 
conditional belief function on the consequent given the antecedents. It is 
demonstrated by example that different joint belief functions may be 
consistent with a given set of rules. Moreover, different representations of 
the same rules may yield different beliefs on the consequent hypotheses. 
1. Introduction 
A popular way of representing knowledge in automated reasoning systems is by a 
set of rules, each asserting belief in some consequent hypothesis conditional 
on belief in some set of antecedent hypotheses. Rule-based systems are 
popular because they are modular (in the sense that each rule represents a 
single, separable "bit" of knowledge), and because the rule format appears to 
be a natural way for humans to encode knowledge. The early idea of rule-based 
systems was to process knowledge entirely symbolically, but applications soon 
demanded the expression of degrees of belief or certainty associated with 
rules. 
The developers of MYCIN (Buchanan and Shortliffe, 1984) assigned "certainty 
factors" to rules, which propagated in an ad hoc manner. Adams (1984) showed 
the equivalence of the MYCIN model with a probabilistic model under certain 
(not too plausible) independence assumptions . Since that time, researchers 
have investigated propagation mechanisms for a number of uncertainty 
representations. We focus in this paper on belief functions, which have been 
advocated as a way of representing incompleteness of evidence (i.e., the 
evidence may bear on the truth of a hypothesis, but be insufficient to prove 
it). 
A fully general model of beliefs (or probabilities) in a network of hypotheses 
requires a specification of a joint belief function (or probability 
distribution) over the entire space of possible combinations of values of all 
the variables. Clearly, such a model would be prohibitively difficult to 
assess in the absence o.f simplifying assumptions. The most common simplifying 
assumption is to assume that the directed graph representing the inferential 
model satisfies a Markov property (Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter, 1987; Shafer, 
Shenoy, and Mellouli, 1986). That is, a node is "screened " by its direct 
neighbors from all other nodes in the graph. The Markov property means that 
beliefs in a node depend on other nodes in the graph only through their 
effects on the beliefs in its neighbors. This assumption not only simplifies 
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Suppose in our example that an author of this paper assessed the followin g 
conditional beliefs for E given A and A. (For convenience, we use A to 
denote A- 1, and A to denote A- 0; similarly for E.) "I feel that A 
justifies a degree of belief of at least . 8  in E, but it may be hi gher. I 
don't want to assign any belief directly to E." This could be expressed as a 
conditional belief function over E given A, that assi gned belief .8 directly 
to E, and left the rest of the belief uncommitted (i.e., the remaining belief 
of . 2  does not discriminate between E and E). We would say that there is a 
. 8  chance that A proves E, and a .2 chance that A has no bearin g on the truth 
of E. The difference between a proposition's belief and its plausibility (1 
minus the belief of its complement) represents the ran ge of permissible 
belief. This range is . 8  to 1. 0 for E given A, and 0 to .2 for E given A. 
Suppose further that conditional on A the author assigned belief .5 directly 
to E, leaving the remaining belief of . 5  uncommitted with respect to E. 
Assume also that the incoming beliefs (whether directly assessed or 
propa gated) assi gn belief . 3  directly to A and . 2  directly to A, leavin g the 
remaining belief of . 5  uncommitted. 
Having assessed the above beliefs on A, what should be our resultant beliefs 
on E? Shafer, Shenoy and Mellouli (1986) discuss a method analogous to 
Pearl's for propagating D/ S beliefs in a network satisfying a Markov 
condition. Laskey and Lehner (1988, in press) discuss how to use 
assumption-based truth maintenance to propagate beliefs when the Markov 
condition holds. These two propagation mechanisms are formally equivalent 
(except that the former cannot handle nonindependencies due to shared 
antecedents) . Both require specification of joint beliefs. Laskey and Lehner 
allow direct specification of beliefs as rules with "belief tokens" as 
antecedents, but the joint beliefs are implicitly defined in the rule 
specification. 
To propagate beliefs in a Markov network, we represent the link A -- E by a 
joint belief function over the cross-product space AXE. The incomin g beliefs 
on A implicitly define a belief function over AXE that is vacuous on E (i.e. , 
it contains information about A, but no information about which of E or E is 
the case). Applying Dempster's Rule produces a combined belief function over 
AXE, which is then collapsed into a marginal belief function over E. This 
resultant belief function may then serve as the input to the link E -- W, just 
as the original beliefs in A mi ght have been propa gated throu gh the link D -­
A from beliefs in D. 
The problem here is how to obtain the joint belief function over the cross 
product space. In the case of a probabilistic model, the two conditional 
probability distributions given A and A are sufficient to represent the link 
A-- E, and could be elicited by simply attaching numbers to rules. 
Unfortunately, there is no unique way of transformin g the conditional belief 
functions we elicited into a joint belief function so that Shafer, Shenoy and 
Mellouli's (1986) propagation mechanism can be applied. And different ways of 
creating the joint beliefs result in different marginal belief functions on E. 
In other words, specifying an inference "rule" (conditional belief function) 
from each value of A to the set E is not sufficient to uniquely determine how 
beliefs in A propagate to beliefs in E. 
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propagation algorithms, but also enables the assessment process to be limited 
to a few hypotheses at a time. 
Pearl (1986) discusses a way to add probabilistic information to a rule-based 
system. The simplicity and understandability of the rule-based formalism are 
retained in this representation. Each rule is associated with a strength, or 
degree to which the antecedents justify the conclusion. In a probabilistic 
system, this strength is represented by a conditional probability. The full 
joint probability distribution is completely determined by: (i) the 
conditional probability distributions over each consequent hypothesis set 
given each possible combination of values of its antecedent hypothesis sets; 
and (ii) the marginal probability distributions of all hypothesis sets 
corresponding to root nodes. 
Likewise, it seems natural to assess a belief function model by assessing 
conditional belief functions on consequent hypothesis sets and marginal belief 
functions on root-node hypothesis sets. Unfortunately, unlike in the 
probabilistic case, this procedure is insufficient to uniquely determine a 
joint belief function over the entire hypothesis space (Dempster, 1968; 
Shafer, 1982). A full joint belief function could be specified by direct 
assessment (cf., Shafer, 1982), but this procedure gives up the simplicity and 
transparency of the rule-based representation. 
If the belief function representation is to prove useful as a method for 
representing and propagating uncertainty in automated reasoning systems, we 
believe that a simple, transparent, and reasonably general formalism for 
eliciting joint belief functions must be developed. In particular, belief 
functions should admit application in problems more general than the nested 
partition structures studied by Shafer and Logan (1987). In this paper, we 
use a simple example to demonstrate that different joint belief functions may 
be consistent with given conditional and marginal belief functions. Several 
different methods for constructing a joint belief function are described, and 
a rationale and associated problems are considered for each. 
2. Example 
Our example concerns a company' s willingness to pay expenses for a trip to the 
AAAI Uncertainty Workshop this summer. Either the company will pay Expenses 
(E- 1) or it will not (E- 0). Among other things, the company' s willingness 
to pay will depend upon whether a paper is presented at the workshop. Let A 
denote Acceptance or rejection of a paper; the paper is either accepted (A -
1) or rejected (A- 0). Graphically, the relationship between these two 
propositions is represented by the directed link A -- E. These propositions 
actually form part of a larger system: e.g., acceptance or rejection depends 
on getting the paper in before the Ueadline; payment of expenses impacts 
attendance at the Rorkshop (D -- A -- E -- W). We focus on a single link 
because of its simplicity, and because it is sufficient to illustrate 
subtleties involved in manipulating marginal and conditional belief functions 
in a tree-structured network. Moreover, once we understand how to propagate 
beliefs across a single link, further propagation is relatively straight­
forward. Suppose we know how beliefs in D propagate through the link D -- A 
to result in beliefs on A. The same mechanism can then be used to propagate 
the resulting beliefs in A through the next link A -- E to obtain marginal 
beliefs in E, and so on up the chain of inference. 
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3. Three Ways of Defining Joint Beliefs 
We present three possible methods for extending the conditional belief 
function to the joint cross-product space: conditional embedding, consonant 
extension, and a third method we call dissonant extension (as the resultant 
joint belief function is in some sense as non-consonant as possible!). For 
each method the marginal belief function (on A) and the conditional belief 
functions (on E given A) are identical. 
3. 1 Conditional Embedding. The method of conditional embedding (cf., Shafer, 
1982), treats each of the conditional belief functions as an independenc 
source of evidence about E. The belief function conditional on A tells us 
there is a . 8  chance that A proves E. We represent this as a .8 belief on the 
set {AE,AE,AE} (A logically implies E), and a . 2  belief on the universal 
set {AE,AE,AE,AE}. The belief function conditional on A tells us there 
is a .5 chance that A proves E. We represent this as a . 5  belief on the set 
{AE,AE,AE} (A logically implies E) and a .5 belief on the universal set. 
Using Dempster's Rule, we combine these two belief functions with our incoming 
beliefs: . 3  belief on A- {AE,AE}, .2 belief on A- {AE,AE}, and .5 
belief on the universal set. The joint belief function that results from 
combining these three belief functions is given in the first column of 
Table 1; the marginal beliefs on E are displayed in Table 2. Conditional 
embedding is the method suggested in Cohen, Laskey and Ulvila (1986). It is 
also the method that results from naive application of the Laskey and Lehner 
method (encoding the rules A-- E and A-- E completely separately, using 
different belief tokens). 
Table 1: Joint Belief on A x E for the 3 Propagation 
Mechanisms of Section 4. 
Conditional Consonant Third 
Subset Embedding Extension Method 
m Bel Pl m Bel Pl m Bel Pl 
EA .24 .24 . 8 .24 .24 .8 . 24 .24 .8 
EA 0 0 .16 0 0 .16 0 0 .16 
EA .1 . 1  .7 .1 .1 .7 .1 .1 . 7  
EA 0 0 .35 0 0 . 35 0 0 .35 
EA, EA .06 .3 .8 .06 . 3 . 8 .06 . 3 .8 
*EA, EA .2 . 54 1 .25 .59 1 .15 .49 1 
EA, EA 0 .24 .9 0 .24 . 9  0 .24 . 9 
EA, EA 0 .1 .76 0 .1 .76 0 .1 .76 
EA, EA 0 0 .46 0 0 .41 0 0 .51 
EA, EA .1 .2 .7 .1 . 2  . 7 .1 . 2 .7 
*EA, EA, EA . 05 .65 1 0 .65 1 .1 .65 1 
EA, EA, EA 0 .3 .9 0 . 3 . 9 0 . 3 .9 
*EA, EA, EA .2 .84 1 .15 .84 1 .25 . 84 1 
EA, EA, EA 0 .2 .76 0 .2 .76 0 .2 .76 
*OExA .05 1 1 .1 1 1 0 1 1 
* differences 
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Table 2: Marginal Beliefs on E for the 3 Different Propagation 
Methods of Section 4. 
Conditional Consonant Third 
Subset Embeddini Extension Method 
m Bel Pl m Bel Pl m Bel Pl 
E . 54 . 54 1 .59 . 59 1 . 49 . 49 1 
E 0 0 . 46 0 0 . 41 0 0 . 51 
OE . 46 1 1 .41 1 1 . 51 1 1 
3.2 Consonant Extension. A consonant belief function is one in which the 
evidence all points in a single direction. In Shafer's ·terminology, the focal 
elements of a consonant belief function must form a nested chain of subsets. 
In our example, both conditional belief functions are consonant (because the 
focal elements (E) and (E,E) form a nested sequence), but the marginal belief 
function over A is not (because there is no way to form a nested sequence from 
{A}, {A), and (A,A}). If, as in our example, we are given cons.onant 
conditional belief functions on E given A and E given A, there is a unique 
way to form a consonant joint belief function with vacuous marginals on A. 
(The marginal on A should be vacuous, as the conditional belief functions are 
meant to represent beliefs about the link from A to E, rather than beliefs 
about A itself.) 
This consonant extension can be viewed as a way of representing 
nonindependency of the conditional belief functions. That is, in the 
consonant extension, we assign beliefs: 
.5 focused on {AE, AE) 
. 3  focused on {AE,AE,AE} 
inconclusive); 
. 2 focused on {AE, AE,AE,AE} 
(A proves E and A proves E); 
(A proves E but A is 
(both are inconclusive) . 
Thus, in conditional embedding we assume that A proves E independently of 
whether A proves E. In the consonant extension, we assume maximal 
nonindependency--the evidential links tend to be valid together. (To encode 
conditional embedding, Laskey and Lehner would define two rules A -- E (. 5) 
and A -- E (. 5) that share a belief token, and another rule A -- E (. 3) using 
another belief token) Tables 1 and 2 depict the joint and marginal beliefs 
obtained from combining this consonant extension with the incoming beliefs on 
A. Note that the marginal beliefs on E differ for the two methods. In 
particular, the range of permissible belief on E is smaller for the consonant 
extension. 
3.3 Dissonant Extension. At one extreme of a spectrum is the nonindependency 
assumed by the consonant extension, where the two evidential links from A and 
A tend to be valid together. Conditional embedding represents a middle 
point, where their validity is independent. At the other extreme is the 
assumption that the link from A to E tends to be valid when the link from A 
to E is invalid, and vice versa. Making this assumption yields the following 
joint belief function representing the link A -- E: 
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.3 focused on {AE,AE} 
.5 focused on {AE,AE,AE} 
.2 focused on {AE,AE,AE} 
(A proves E and A proves E); 
(A proves E but A is inconclusive); 
(A proves E but A is inconclusive). 
Note that this joint belief function has no belief focused on the entire cross 
product space (although belief is inconclusive with respect to E for all but 
the first focal element). Figures 1 and 2 depict the joint and marginal 
beliefs after this belief function has been combined with the incoming beliefs 
over A. Note that the belief range widens progressively as we move from the 
consonant extension to conditional embedding to our third method. 
4 So Which Method Do I Use? 
In this simple example, we believe most people's intuition would point to the 
results produced by the consonant extension method. Consider the following 
argument: "If I have . 8  belief in E when A is true and .5 belief when A is 
true, then I should have at least . 5  belief in E no matter which is true. The 
difference between .8 and .5 represents the belief that A justifies over and 
above the belief when A is true." Indeed, the consonant extension propagates 
a vacuous belief function over A to a belief function focusing . 5  belief on 
{E} and .5 belief on {E,E}. 
We also note that the consonant extension method gives the same results as the 
natural interval probability model for this example. The reader should 
beware, however, of interpreting belief functions as interval 
probabilities--cf., Black, (1987) ; Laskey, (1987) . 
Conditional embedding, on the other hand, propagates vacuous beliefs on A to 
only . 8x. 5 - . 4 0  belief focused on {E} and .60  belief focused on {E,E}. This 
"leaking out" of belief to the universal set is a consequence of the 
independence assumption underlying conditional embedding. The argument for 
using conditional embedding would go something like this: "I can prove E no 
matter what the value of A only if both evidential links are valid, which has 
probability . 8x. 5 - . 4 0. "  
If, as we do, you find this argument less convincing than the first, it means 
that you think the kind of nonindependence assumed by the consonant extension 
model is appropriate for this problem. Unfortunately, the consonant extension 
method does not generalize to the case when the conditional belief functions 
are not consonant. (It was no accident that the only non-consonant belief 
function in our example was the marginal over A). Nevertheless, this method 
may represent a simple and compelling way of constructing joint belief 
functions when the input conditional belief functions are consonant. (It 
should be mentioned that, like probabilities, consonant belief functions may 
be assessed by specifying only a single number for each hypothesis. Assessing 
a general belief function requires specifying a number for each member of the 
power set of the hypothesis space.) 
We grant that the restriction to consonant belief functions may not prove a 
problem in many applications. However, it may be the case �hat a more general 
conditional belief function is required. The chief virtue of the method of 
conditional embedding is that it can be applied regardless of the structure of 
the conditional belief functions. If the independence assumption seems 
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untenable, the alternative is assessing a belief function over the entire 
cross product space, and sacrificing the simplicity of assessment based on 
rules. 
5. Caveat Modelor 
Extending Shafer-Dempster theory to propagating beliefs in rule-based systems 
requires a way to represent and elicit beliefs about the relationship between 
antecedent and consequent. Specifying belief functions on qualititative rules 
results in conditional belief functions, which must then be transformed into 
joint belief functions. We have demonstrated three different ways of 
extending conditional and marginal belief functions to a joint belief 
function. Each of these methods arises from different assumptions about the 
joint relationship between antecedent and consequent, and produces different 
results when propagating beliefs. It is our view that the method of consonant 
extension is the most satisfying in the example of this paper, but it is 
limited to consonant conditional belief functions. 
The differences among methods in our simple example may seem slight, but we 
feel that they point to fundamental issues that deserve further study. We 
suspect that many readers share our uneasiness about making the kinds of 
independence judgments this problem asks of us. We are not sure we really 
understand what it means for the evidential links A -- E and A -- E to be 
"independent" or "valid together." We believe that for belief functions to be 
used properly in rule-based systems, knowledge engineers and experts need to 
have good "canonical stories" (Shafer, 1982) that apply not just to single 
hypotheses but to the links between hypotheses. 
In any case, all three analyses presented herein suggest that the company is 
likely to pay for the authors' trip to the conference. Readers are encouraged 
to substitute their own numbers to reach their own conclusions. 
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